

Viktor Eszterhai –Éva Dóra Druhalóczki: Trump 2.0 from the Perspective of Chinese Experts: Implications for Bilateral Relations and the World Order¹

Executive Summary

- Based on Chinese expert assessments, Trump's second presidential term represents both a challenge and a strategic opportunity for China.
- The term increases economic and political uncertainty, while also providing Beijing with space to strengthen its global role, provided it maintains strategic composure.
- Chinese experts point out that in recent years China has reduced its previous unilateral dependencies, creating a strategic stalemate that, in principle, provides an opportunity to stabilize bilateral relations.
- Trump's foreign policy accelerates the erosion of the US alliance system, which primarily provides opportunities for China in the Indo-Pacific region.
- The U.S. questioning of Western-origin norms and rules enables China to act as an active rule-maker in global governance, offering the Global South an alternative, development-oriented model.
- Instead of the previously reactive, defensive posture, China now proactively shapes its communications and narratives, thereby reinforcing its image as a responsible and stable great power, while simultaneously intensifying great power competition within this sphere.

Donald Trump's second presidency poses a serious challenge for China, yet Beijing also views this case as a strategic opportunity. Future Chinese objectives and strategic tools will largely depend on how it assesses the events of recent months and their impact on bilateral relations and the international system. Although we do not have direct access to decision-makers' thinking, analyses by Chinese experts provide valuable insight into the contours of the official discourse and the direction of strategic reasoning. The aim of this analysis is to provide a descriptive overview and systematization of the main tendencies in the Chinese expert discourse. The study does not seek to evaluate the objectivity or reliability of the experts' statements; rather, it treats these views as perceptions that reflect Chinese strategic thinking. The original contribution of the analysis lies in structuring the discourse, identifying its recurring emphases, patterns, and focal points, and demonstrating how these elements outline China's possible strategic interpretive frameworks in relation to the Trump administration's foreign policy.

1. Introduction

Donald Trump's second presidential term, which began in January 2025, not only shapes the future of U.S.-China relations but also confront the entire international order with new challenges. Trump's return to the White House has started political and economic processes that go far beyond the bilateral relationship: his decisions may determine the

global balance of power, the functioning of international institutions, and the foundational principles of the liberal world order. The experience of the previous term (2017-2021) had already indicated that Trump's policies tend to override established norms of international cooperation, yet this tendency is manifesting

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even more strongly in his second term. The new administration's unusual and often contradictory actions from protectionist economic policies to the reinterpretation of U.S. security guarantees – signal that the U.S. remains willing to disrupt the status quo in order to advance its own interests.

In these circumstances, it is crucial for China to accurately interpret the new directions of U.S. policy. What is at stake is not only the future of bilateral trade and political relations, but also how Beijing can redefine its strategic objectives and global role within a transforming world order. The assessments of Chinese experts and decision-makers therefore reflect not only China's tactical responses to U.S. actions, but also the evolution of the Chinese long-term strategic thinking.

Our analysis is based on the descriptive exploration of the Chinese expert discourse: we systematize the perceptions that emerge from these statements, and examine how China interprets its relationship with the United States through the focal points of this discourse. The analysis of these narratives also reveals how Beijing understands the transformation of the international order in light of the Trump administration's policies.

2. Opinions of Chinese experts before Trump took office

The US presidential election was already surrounded by serious concerns in China at the end of 2024, which also affected public opinion. Beijing, indeed, congratulated Trump on his electoral victory, emphasizing that it did not wish to make premature judgments, as it is "ready to cooperate with the United States based on mutual respect".² At the same time, behind the diplomatic restraint, Chinese state media cautiously hinted at the risks, above all the possibility of a trade war.³ Concerns about the future of bilateral relations have also appeared in expert analyses. After the elections, the majority of Chinese experts were concerned about the economic and technological impacts of a second Trump administration, rather than a direct military conflict. According to the opinions, the greatest risk was the revival of trade wars and the intensification of U.S. technological pressure on China.⁴ In this light, Wang Jisi, professor at Peking University, emphasized that trade policy would be the main point of contention, rather than the military sphere.⁵ Wu Xinbo, professor at Fudan University, highlighted the anti-China stance of newly appointed U.S. officials – such as Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Michael Waltz as National Security Advisor. However, Yuan Zheng, professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, noted that stabilizing the political team could reduce the risk of unexpected developments.⁶ Experts emphasize that Donald Trump is certain to reshape the world in two ways: first, through actions that overturn established norms and second, through a transactional approach to foreign policy. Jia Qingguo, professor at Peking University, underscores: "The U.S.-China relations will be extremely difficult to manage. We must prepare for some of Trump's immoral and principle-free actions without responding in a similar manner ourselves".⁷ At the same time, Jin Canrong, professor at Renmin University, emphasizes that Trump, as a businessman with a neutral stance toward Taiwan, could even create more favourable opportunities for China in the process of national reunification.⁸ According to Yan Xuetong, professor at Tsinghua University, China should primarily focus its efforts on balancing the power disparity between the two countries – seeing the solution in China's own domestic reforms.⁹

² [President Xi Jinping Sends Congratulatory Message to President-elect of the United States Donald J. Trump](#), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People's Republic of China, 07.11.2024 [Online, 17.11.2025]

³ [Xi congratulates Trump on his election as US president](#), Global Times, 07.11.2024 [Online, 17.11.2025]

⁴ TARNOWSKI, Arthur: [Selected voices from China after the 2024 US presidential election](#). Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 15.11.2024 [Online, 11.10.2025]

⁵ XU, Yiyang and JIA, Yuxuan: [Wang Jisi on U.S. domestic politics in Trump's Second Term](#) From China's leading America watcher. Pekingology, 16.05.2025 [Online, 11.10.2025]

⁶ KAUFMAN, Arthur: [Chinese Experts, State Media React to the Arrival of Trump 2.0](#), China Digital Times. 22.01.2025 [Online, 17.11.2025]

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ JIN, Canrong: [王炸轮番出，中美这轮强悍的对攻将见分晓](#) [Using the "Big Trump Card" Strategy in the China-US Confrontation]. Guancha, 15.10.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

⁹ WANG, Orange: [China 'not dreading' Trump 2.0, but reforms will decide who wins big power game](#). South China Morning Post, 21.12.2024 [Online, 11.10.2025]

Overall, Chinese expert opinions reflect that, although official communications were restrained and diplomatic, experts clearly recognized the risks arising from the new term – at the same time, they were consciously seeking strategic opportunities as well. This approach laid the foundation for subsequent Chinese foreign policy planning and narrative-building.

3. Chinese expert opinions on bilateral relations after Trump took office

Following Trump's inauguration in January 2025, the Chinese expert discourse clearly reflected the recognition that the relationship between the two great powers had entered a new phase. Although most experts anticipated conflicts – as indeed soon materialized with the escalation of the trade war in April – the general assessment was that the earlier era of U.S. dominance had come to an end. The concept of a "balanced power relationship" (*shijunlidi* 势均力敌) shaped China's intention both to reduce its dependence on the United States and to pursue strong interdependencies. According to Lau Siu-kai, emeritus professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, this situation is the result of a "decade-long, deliberate strategic calculation", during which Beijing diversified its trade relations, reduced its dollar dependence, and established alternative financial infrastructure (CIPS) to mitigate the potential exclusion from the SWIFT system.¹⁰ In Lau's interpretation, this new balance also means that Washington's coercive capacity has weakened: a trade war, technological embargo, or financial sanctions would now also harm U.S. investors, thereby undermining dollar hegemony. In line with this, Ma Xiaolin, dean of Zhejiang University of International Studies, emphasized the role of economic cooperation as a "ballast stone" (*ya cang shi* 压舱石) in bilateral relations. In his view, enduring stabilization depends on political will, but maintaining the communication channel between the two leaders is possible through the "separation of politics and economics".¹¹ From this perspective, the stalemate outcome of the trade war by early May is readily understandable. Wu Xinbo, professor at Fudan University, attributes China's remarkable success largely to the U.S.'s failure to fully grasp the situation when initiating a new round of the trade war.¹² In his assessment, the two parties found themselves in a semi-strategic deadlock after seven years of a quasi-war situation, in which the dynamic had long been "U.S. offense, Chinese defence". Jin Canrong, professor at Renmin University, likened the current deadlock to the Battle of Triangle Hill of the Korean War¹³: under U.S. pressure, China responded symmetrically, leading ultimately to mutual exhaustion. According to this logic, the initiative now rests with Washington – if the U.S. chooses de-escalation, Beijing would respond proportionally, creating the possibility for temporary stability.¹⁴

Da Wei, director of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, shares a similar view on the previous situation's rebalancing. Instead of the earlier "U.S. capital-Chinese manufacturing" model based on mutual dependence, two parallel projects rooted in national self-definition have emerged: the American "Make America Great Again" and the Chinese "national rejuvenation" visions, which have even "created an opportunity to place bilateral relations on a more stable footing". According to Da Wei, the key to long-term coexistence lies in limiting economic cooperation to clearly defined areas based on mutual benefits, while managing geopolitical tensions with discipline.¹⁵

¹⁰ LIU, Siu-kai: [中美贸易战重塑国际秩序](#) [How the China-US Trade War Reshapes the International Order]. 大公报 (Ta Kung Pao), 31.10.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

¹¹ MA, Xiaolin: [中美元首会晤释放三大信号, "斗而不破"进入新阶段](#) [The China-U.S. Leaders' Meeting Sends Three Key Signals, "Struggle but Not Break" Enters a New Stage]. *iFeng iShare*, 31.10.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

¹² WU, Xinbo: 观察者网: 特朗普2.0时代的中美关系, 节奏在于中国 [China Sets the Pace in China-US Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era]. 观察者网 (Guancha), 29.08.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

¹³ The Battle of Triangle Hill (Shangganling) was one of the bloodiest and longest mountain battles of the Korean War in the autumn of 1952, where Chinese-North Korean forces and UN troops fought for the strategic heights at extremely heavy losses; although the UN forces temporarily captured the hill, they later abandoned their positions, so the battle ended with a tactical advance but no strategic gain.

¹⁴ JIN, 2025.

¹⁵ DA, Wei: America and China Can Have a Normal Relationship: How to Move Past Strategic Competition. *Foreign Affairs*, 30.10.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].



The China-U.S. summit held in Busan in October 2025 underscored this message. According to Shen Yi, professor at Fudan University, the summit framed the bilateral relationship within the context of “leader-level diplomacy” (*yuanshou wajiao* 元首外交), signalling a shift from tactical confrontation toward strategic stabilization.¹⁶ Holding the summit in a third country was symbolically significant: it allows space for future reciprocal visits and helps define the framework for cooperation.

Overall, Chinese expert assessments indicate that Trump’s second term did not trigger a shock in Beijing but rather ushered in a period of mutual adaptation and strategic recalibration. Replacing the previous image of a “reactive China”, a proactive China emerges, one that reinforces its independent strategic identity and is no longer merely a recipient of crises, but a shaper of the new bilateral balance.

4. Trump 2.0 and the structural transformation of the world order

The shift in the U.S.-China balance of power during the Trump 2.0 term carries not only bilateral but also systemic consequences. Wang Jisi states that a historical transition is underway, bringing a “globalization without American centrality”.¹⁷ Yan Xuetong emphasizes that Trump’s policies weakened the United States’ global leadership: “Trump’s policies represented a regression for the United States, leading to a decline in the country’s overall national strength and negatively affecting its global influence and scientific research capacity”.¹⁸ Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Studies at Nanjing University, pointed out that the main political actions of the second Trump administration – large-scale deportations, imposition of new tariffs, revocation of Biden-era orders, and regional influence-building – are not merely domestic decisions, but also represent a challenge to international norms.¹⁹ In line with it, Zheng Yongnian, professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, asserts that the U.S. is now in the midst of a “structural transformation”.²⁰ This process is not solely the result of Trump’s personal decisions, but also an eruption of deep contradictions within American society and the political system. According to Zheng, the crisis reshapes the existing world order on four levels: a) the internal political order of the U.S., b) the democratic federal system, c) the U.S. regional alliance network, and d) the liberal international order maintained by the U.S. since World War II.

Zheng compares Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement to Gorbachev’s perestroika: both aim at national rejuvenation, while potentially triggering systemic transformations. If the U.S. domestic political crisis leads to the disintegration of institutional order and the collapse of the federal system, the global consequences would be significant: American retrenchment would create new manoeuvring space for China and other emerging powers. According to Zheng, the partial withdrawal of the U.S. from the international system does not signify the end of globalization, but rather its territorial reorganization. In line with this, the U.S. is constructing a “three-ring order”: internal order – regional dominance – Western hemisphere control, while gradually relinquishing the burden of global hegemony.

In the Chinese expert discourse, the view is increasingly emerging that the historical foundations of Western dominance are eroding, while China and the Global South constitute a new developmental counterweight. According to Jin Canrong, professor at Renmin University, the rise of the West in the 18th-19th centuries did not stem from the triumph of enlightenment ideals, but from the material power

¹⁶ SHEN, Yi: [逸语道破：釜山会晤的新提法，体现了构建中美关系的新思路](#) [New Formulations at the Busan Summit Reflect New Thinking on Building China-US Relations]. *观察者网* (Guancha), 30.10.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

¹⁷ WANG, Jisi: [专访王缉思：中美关系不会再回到从前，甚至可能会更糟](#) [Exclusive Interview with Wang Jisi: China-US Relations Will Not Return to the Past and May Even Worsen]. 清华大学战略与安全研究中心微信公众号 (Tsinghua University Center for International Strategy and Security), 06.08.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

¹⁸ SUN, Chenghao, ZHANG, Xueyu, and YAO, Jiayu: [YAN Xuetong on Moral Issues in International Politics](#). *China Affairs+*, 30.06.2025 [Online, 18.11.2025].

¹⁹ CHEN, Caixia, WU, Xinru és XUE Lingqiao: [\(W.E. Talk\) What will Trump 2.0 mean for the U.S. and the globe?](#) *Ecns.com*, 21.02.2025 [Online, 11.10.2025].

²⁰ ZHENG, Yongnian: [“特朗普之变”是否会演变成美国的“戈尔巴乔夫之变”?](#) [Will the Trump Transformation Evolve into an American Gorbachev Transformation?]. 华南理工大学公共政策研究院微信公众号 (Institute of Public Policy, South China University of Technology), 2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

generated by industrial capitalism. Modernization, therefore, was the result of industrialization, not democracy. The values promoted by the West were products of the industrial era, not its prerequisites. In today's world, however, the balance of industrial capacities has fundamentally shifted: "China's industrial output is now on par with that of the entire G7, marking a decisive moment in the process of "the rise of the East and the decline of the West."²¹ Consequently, for non-Western countries, it is not Western ideologies, but the path of industrial modernization will determine development.²²

After Trump's second inauguration, the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University launched a series of lectures analysing the new directions of U.S. foreign policy. These interpretations emphasize that Trump's foreign policy serves to extend domestic political objectives and that the disruption of norms aims to consolidate his own power. Within this logic, the principle of "predatory hegemony" dominates, rather than acceptance of a multipolar world. Overall, this reshapes the United States' relationship with its allies.²³ In line with this, Yan Xuetong points out that, for example, following the trade war, Japan is gradually shifting from a "unilateral strategy" back to a "hedging strategy," meaning it seeks to simultaneously mitigate the risks coming from both China and the United States.²⁴ A similar process can also be observed in Europe, where hedging approaches are increasingly spreading due to dual security pressures. According to Yan's forecast, this trend will continue to strengthen over the next decade, with countries increasingly adopting different strategies depending on the issue: relying on China in matters of trade and shaping the global economic order, while continuing to depend on the United States for financial and military security concerns.

Overall, the Chinese expert discourse interprets the current transformation of the world order not as a crisis, but as a historical correction: a process in which non-Western civilizations once again assume a central role in determining the directions of global development.

5. Trump 2.0. as strategic advantage

Donald Trump's second administration represents both a challenge and an opportunity for China. Most of the Chinese expert discourse suggests that the situation offers strategic advantages for Beijing, provided that China maintains strategic composure (*zhanlue ding li* 战略定力).²⁵ The U.S.' domestic and foreign policy actions inherently weaken its own power positions, so China's task is to capitalize on these developments rather than engage in direct confrontation. Chinese analysts identify three areas where the situation is particularly favourable:

- The weakening of the United States' global positions: China can further accelerate the impact of tariffs and trade restrictions through communication and economic tools, gaining an advantage in shaping global narratives.
- Disruption and fragmentation of the U.S. alliance system: Beijing can respond with alternative partnership proposals, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, where unilateral pressure and transactional deals diminish U.S. attractiveness.
- U.S. retrenchment: This creates an opportunity for China to act as an active rule-maker in global governance, strengthening the concept of a multipolar world order and amplifying the voice of the Global South

Chinese experts emphasize that Trump's domestic policy actions lead to internal destabilization of American society and the economy. According to Zhu Feng, a specialist at the Centre for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, the U.S. diminishes its international influence by sidelining soft power tools, while its aggressive tariff policies and unilateralism are broadly unpopular among other

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² JIN, Canrong: [中美竞争今年开始进入战略相持阶段](#) [This Year, China-US Competition Has Entered a Phase of Strategic Stalemate"]. *Beijing Daily App*, 02.07.2025. [Online, 19.11.2025].

²³ IISS: [PKU Holds Seminar on "The Trump Effect in Great Power Relations and Regional Order Restructuring" and the 24th North Pavilion Salon](#). Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, 2025.04.29. [Online, 2025.10.11].

²⁴ SUN, et al., 2025.

²⁵ LI, Yaqi: [Chinese Scholarly Debate on the "Trumpization" of U.S. Foreign Policy: Positions and Implications](#). *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 24.06.2025 [Online, 13.10.2025]



countries. Zhu points out that Trump's policies stand in sharp contrast to China's foreign policy, which – in rhetoric – aims at global cooperation and the benefit of humanity. At the same time, exploiting strategic advantages is a complex process: a simple "good vs. bad" narrative is insufficient, and power relations as well as international institutional frameworks must be continuously taken into account.²⁶

Xiang Haoyu and Du Lan also emphasize the weaknesses of the U.S. alliance system. According to their analysis, China must maintain strategic composure while offering regional integration and public goods to neighbouring states. This is particularly crucial in the Indo-Pacific region, where export restrictions, trade constraints, and an increased military focus diminish the attractiveness of the U.S.²⁷

U.S. retrenchment creates an opportunity for China to take an active rule-making role in global governance. In the Chinese discourse, the multipolar world order is a central element: it facilitates the development of "jointly rewritten rules", strengthens the voice of the Global South, and contributes to shaping China's international image. At a Tsinghua University lecture in January 2025, analysts characterized Trump's Africa policy as a continuation of arrogance and indifference, signalling that the U.S. cannot be considered a reliable partner for the Global South. In contrast, China positions itself as an advocate for the developing world, and this narrative paradoxically strengthens China's soft power position without engaging in direct confrontation.²⁸

According to Chinese experts, the crisis of U.S. hegemony does not create a power vacuum, but rather ushers in an era of pluralized modernities. Yan Xuetong emphasizes that the partial withdrawal of the U.S. results in issue-specific global leadership, where multiple actors can exercise decisive influence in different domains.²⁹ Xie Maosong derives China's new global role from the continuity of Chinese civilization.³⁰ The "four global initiatives" – Development, Security, Civilization, and Governance³¹ – provide an integrated normative framework that emphasizes sovereign equality, multilateral cooperation, and respect for international law.

Global rule-making is most advanced in development policy. Huang Yiping highlights the failure of the "Washington Consensus" and proposes a "Global South Consensus", based on the synergy between the state and the market, in which China's experiences can serve as a guide.³² Pan Yue, using the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail as an example, advocates a "full lifecycle participation" model to ensure sustainable, long-term partnerships.³³ Zhang Wenmu emphasizes the principle of the "mass line" (*qunzhong luxian* 群众路线), based on the needs and legitimacy of local communities, as key to stable, partnership-oriented cooperation. In this way, China can avoid repeating the mistakes of past empires in large railway and infrastructure projects.³⁴

In summary, Trump's second term paradoxically represents both a challenge and an opportunity for China. The internal destabilization of the U.S. and the weaknesses of its alliance system create strategic space for Beijing. At the same time, realizing actual advantages requires continuous consideration of power

²⁶ ZHU, Feng: "特朗普关税"是开倒车·美国定会反对美国 ['Trump Tariffs' Are a Step Back, and the United States Will Certainly Oppose Itself]. *Tsinghua University Center for International Strategy and Security*, 23.04.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

²⁷ XIANG, Haoyu and DU, Lan: [收缩与聚焦：美国“印太战略”的嬗变与前瞻](#) [Contraction and Focus: The Evolution and Prospects of the U.S. "Indo-Pacific Strategy"]. 2025.08.29 [Online, 2025.11.19.].

²⁸ [IIAS African Studies Lecture | Current African Situation and Prospects of Trump 2.0 Policies Towards Africa](#). *Institute for International and Area Studies, Tsinghua University* [Online, 14.10.2025]

²⁹ Sun et al., 2025.

³⁰ XIE, Maosong: [和平发展，这是用中国文明史写就的一篇大文章](#) [Peaceful Development, A Grand Essay Written Through the History of Chinese Civilization]. *观察者网 (Guancha)*, 02.10.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].].

³¹ The "four global initiatives" – Development (2021), Security (2022), Civilization (2023), and Governance (2025) – embody China's systemic strategy for advancing international public goods and shaping a more just and sustainable global order.

³² HUANG, Yiping: [“华盛顿共识”破产后](#) [After the Collapse of the Washington Consensus]. *Shared Development, Beijing University National School of Development*, 2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

³³ PAN, Yue: [我坐上雅万高铁，才看懂东南亚的基建困局](#) [Only After Taking the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail Did I Understand Southeast Asia's Infrastructure Dilemma]. *文化纵横*, 29.10.2025 [Online, 19.11.2025].

³⁴ ZHANG, Wenmu: [走到哪里人都要吃饭——谈谈高铁能力的想象与地缘政治理论的意义](#) ["Wherever People Go, They Must Eat – Imagining High-Speed Rail Capacity and the Significance of Geopolitical Theory"]. 12.04.2024 [Online, 19.11.2025].



relations and international institutional frameworks, as well as the consistent maintenance of strategic composure, which is crucial for strengthening China's long-term global role.

6. Conclusion

Since the study is based on the systematization of the perceptions present in the Chinese expert discourse and on identifying its focal points, the conclusions primarily reflect how China interprets its own strategic position and the foreign policy of the Trump administration. This approach made it possible to focus not on evaluating the experts' claims, but on the underlying logic of Chinese strategic thinking that emerges from them. Based on the Chinese expert discourse, Trump's second presidential term did not trigger panic in Beijing; instead, it resulted in a deliberate strategic reinterpretation. While during the first Trump administration China adopted a defensive stance in response to U.S. trade wars and technological restrictions, by 2025 it is proactively leveraging U.S. political divisions to strengthen its own narratives and global position –both domestically and internationally. According to Chinese analysts, three key aspects of strategic adaptation stand out:

- Trump 2.0 as both risk and opportunity: U.S. domestic political instability and weaknesses in the alliance system increase economic uncertainty and trade tensions, while also offering China the chance to present itself as a stable, responsible power to the international community, in sharp contrast to the image of the United States.
- Strategic composure and soft power: China no longer communicates merely from a defensive position but actively shapes global discourse and U.S. public opinion. Exploiting strategic advantages is, however, a complex process: Beijing must continuously assess power relations and international institutional frameworks while maintaining strategic composure.
- Multipolarity and global narrative: Trump's unilateral, self-interest-driven foreign policy reinforces China's image as representing an alternative to the existing world order. Strengthening a multipolar world and the voice of the Global South is a strategic tool that allows Beijing to expand its influence in developing regions, including Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. This narrative-building constitutes a key dimension of China's soft power and diplomatic strategy.

Overall, Trump's second term paradoxically represents both a challenge and an opportunity for China. U.S. internal destabilization and weaknesses in the alliance system create strategic space for Beijing, yet realizing tangible advantages requires continuous, multidimensional strategic assessment. China's proactive and deliberate strategy – the coordinated use of economic, diplomatic, and soft power instruments –enables the country to act not merely as a reactive player, but as an active shaper in the formation of the new global balance.



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